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According to the classical literature on delegation in the regulatory state, independent regulators 
are established to enhance the credibility of regulatory policies. In that regard, anticorruption 
agencies are peculiar not only as they are very salient, but also because they receive delegated 
competencies from the government as the “principal”,while at the same time the government also 
constitutes their regulatory target. How do governments manage regulatory reforms to strike the 
balance between the credibility gains they could earn as “principals” and the credibility losses 
from they could suffer as targets? Drawing on insights of historical institutionalism, thisarticle 
undertakes a qualitative longitudinal analysis oforganizational change regarding anticorruption 
agencies in Italy, where this kind of agencies are particularly relevant for political leaders. 
Findings shed light on delegation understood as a dynamic process where multiple factors intersect 
over time.  
 
Introduction 
The delegation of public tasks to agencies is considered to be one of the main public governance 
innovations that have taken place in industrialized and developing countries during the past two 
decades (Verhoest et al. 2012). Different research communities have dealt with the agencification of 
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public bureaucracies which partially overlap and do not constitute fully separate research traditions 
(Flinders 2009).  
Three main communities can be identified with respect to their research agenda on 
agencification (Maggetti and Verhoest 2014): a number of regulatory studies focused on the 
institutional design of agencies in order to examine the mechanisms of political control over 
bureaucratic autonomy drawing on the principal-agent framework (McCubbins et al. 1989; Moe 
1990); research in public policy and political science examined the establishment, diffusion and 
independence of regulatory agencies focusing on the functional and non-functional pressures for 
delegation (Gilardi 2008; Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004; Thatcher 2002) as well as assessing how 
formal aspects of independence translate into de facto autonomy (Koop and Hanretty 2013; 
Maggetti 2007); the relationship between formal and de facto autonomy has been also investigated 
by public management scholarswhich predominantly used survey methodologies to gather 
perceptual data in comparative perspective (Verhoest et al. 2010).  
The issue of agency autonomy within a framework of political control lies at the intersection 
between the three research communities. Insights from regulatory theory (McCubbins et al. 1989) 
have been used by both political science/public policy (Thatcher 2005) and public management 
(Van Thiel and Yesilkagit 2008) scholars to address the enduring tension between agency autonomy 
and political control. As for the benefits, the political science/public policy literature has identified 
the rationales for delegation to agencies which assist political principals in responding to pressures 
and problems (Elgie 2006; Thatcher 2002).  
As for the costs, they result from “agency losses” that is agencies acting contrary to the 
preferences of their principals which can use a repertoire of political control tools to address them 
(Thatcher 2005). Consequently, the powers and autonomy that agencies are granted at the outset 
depend on the balance between the pressures for delegation and political principals’ strong 
incentives for minimizing agency losses. Yet, the capacity of political principals to design public 
agencies for the long run is limited (Boin et al. 2010) since design features have time-varying 
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effects often generating unanticipated consequences of delegation (Wilks and Bartle 2002). This is 
why political principals rely on agency oversight which is carried out to keep agency losses at a 
minimum after agency design (Balla 2011).  
However, most of studies within the three research communities (regulatory, public policy 
and public management studies) provide a “snapshot” representation of agency design leaving its 
dynamic nature underexplored (Maggetti and Verhoest 2014). Drawing on organizational ecology 
(Hannan and Freeman 1989), the third community of public management scholars has only recently 
engaged in the quantitative study of longitudinal change and continuity in relation to state agencies 
(MacCarthaigh and Roness 2012). A body of longitudinal quantitative analysis mostly focused on 
patterns of agency birth and terminationhas also developed in the regulatory studies on the US 
presidential system (Boin et al. 2010; Lewis 2003; Selin 2015) and in the public policy and political 
science studies focused on parliamentary systems (Greasley and Hanretty 2016).  
Yet, quantitative longitudinal analyses track year-by-year differences in the pool of agencies 
without grasping the complexity of their life span which is shaped by the interaction between the 
strategies and reform programs of political elites and the responses of agencies to reform proposals 
(Overman et al. 2014). First, data on the continued presence of an agency from year to year to do 
not shed light on other structural or procedural changes influencing its autonomy (Bach and Jann 
2010). Second, large-N data overlook the “black box” of the process by which government proceeds 
from initial proposal to decision under the influence of agencies as active players who react to 
pressures for reform (Dommett and Skelcher 2014). 
Against this backdrop, this article contributes to the emerging literature highlighting the 
necessity of supplementing large-N data with in-depth qualitative analysis to investigate the 
dynamics of organizational change following regulatory reforms that influences the autonomy of 
regulatory agencies. The case of Italian anticorruption agenciesis particularly suitable to undergo 
this kindof analysis because, on the one hand, anticorruption policies display a high level of 
political salience (OECD 2013a), and, on the other hand, corruption is a salient feature of public life 
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in Italy (Transparency International 2016). Thereby, this case epitomizes situations where 
credibility issues manifest them intensively, such as in other countries that are similarly affected by 
corruption problems and in other sectors that are traditionally tightly related to the government(e.g. 
utilities and communications). 
Whereas other recent studies contributed to this literature by focusing on policy meanings 
(Elston 2014) and meta-governance (Dommett and Flinders 2015), this article 
complementsprincipal-agent theory with insights of new institutionalism by focusing on delegation 
as “a process rather than one-off event” (Thatcher 2002), one in which agencies can be active 
agents (Wilks and Bartle 2002).  
By focusing only on agency design, these studies have not tracked the trajectory of agency 
development which do not necessarily constitute an irreversible self-reinforcing sequence as 
highlighted by those historical institutionalist accounts which leave more room for change within 
the path as they understand historical evolution as a “reactive sequence”, that is a chain of events 
linked through reactions and counter-reactions (Mahoney 2000). Reactive sequencing has been also 
recognized by those public management accounts (Pollitt 2008; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2009) which 
shed light on the cycles/alternations in public management policy which are triggered by changes in 
government and feedback effects from unintended consequences of reform efforts.  
Research on reactive sequencing constitutes the context in which a seminal research on 
anticorruption agencies (Batory 2012) tracked changes over time in agencies’ mandate explaining 
why their life cycles are not simply a function of their initial mandate since their autonomy will 
evolve in a “series of attacks and counterattacks”, the outcomes of which are shaped by the 
interplay between political factors and agency activism. Building on this seminal study, our 
research uses a within-case analysis joining the call for more efforts directed to intensive research 
strategies for a better understanding of the interplay between explanatory factors over time 
(Verhoest and Maggetti 2014; Verhoest et al. 2007; Van Thiel and Yesilkagit 2011). 
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More specifically, we provide a diachronic examination of variations in the independence of 
anticorruption agencies in Italy following their repeated interaction with the government, which 
constitutes the “principal” that will benefit from the increased credibility of regulatory policies, but 
that at the same time could suffer from serious credibility losses as their regulatory target. The 
article is structured as follows: the next section presents the framework that we apply to the 
longitudinal study of delegation to anticorruption agencies in Italy. After the discussion of data and 
methods, the following empirical section tracks the process of delegation to Italian anticorruption 
agencies over time. Discussion and conclusions follow.   
 
Delegation to Anti-Corruption Agencies in Italy and the Process of Regulatory Reform 
Following a key argument of the classical literature on delegation in the regulatory state, the main 
functional rationale for delegating regulatory competencies to agencies that enjoy formal 
independence from the government derives from the need for guaranteeing the credibility of 
regulatory policies (Majone 1996: 3-4). Indeed,stakeholders (e.g., foreign investors), consumers and 
citizens may anticipate a consistency problem due to political pressures and the uncertainties related 
to the political cycle. Therefore, like Ulysses with the Sirens, governments decide to bind 
themselves to achieve their goal, that is, to create credible policy commitments. As tying their hands 
comes at a cost, since governments will no longer be able to easily revert regulatory policies, 
delegation is expected to take place especially when the incumbent is facing a serious credibility 
problem, such as for the liberalization of former public utilities and communication companies.  
The case of anti-corruption agencies – (ACAs) understood as “publically funded bodies of a durable 
nature whose specific mission is to fight corruption and to reduce the opportunity structures 
favorable to its occurrence through preventive and repressive strategies” (DeSousa 2010) –  is 
peculiar because the government is not merely the “principal” who will achieve credibility gains by 
creating credible policy commitments. It is also the target of regulation, who could suffer from 
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credibility losses when an independent regulator would expose possible misconduct in the public 
sector and, above all, as regards to the core executive of the government itself (Maor 2004).  
These credibility losses could be exceptionally serious, because, on the one hand, anticorruption 
policies display a high level of political salience in a context of increasing concern for corruption 
within public institutions (OECD 2013a). On the other hand,pressures for credible commitment are 
particularly intense in countries such Italy where corruption is a salient feature of public life: in the 
Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International 2016), Italy moved down from the 33th 
rank out of 41 countries in 1995 to the 94
th 
out of 176 countries in 2012 before improving to the 
61st out of 168 countries in 2015; according to a recent Eurobarometer survey (European 
Commission 2014), 97% of Italian population (EU average 76%) perceived in 2013 corruption as 
widespread in the country while previous bi-annual surveys conducted in the period 2005-2011 
highlighted the fact that a large majority of citizens in Italy believed that corruption was a major 
problem for their country (from 74% in 2005 to 87% in 2011 while the EU average rose from 72% 
to 74% in the same period).  
According to these arguments, it is expected the following: 
 
Hypothesis 1.1: Italian anti-corruption agencies are strengthened (or weakened) over time by 
the government following functional reasons as regards the supply-side of credibility. 
Specifically, the government delegates more independence when its expected gains in terms 
of credibility as a principal outweigh its potential losses in terms of credibility as a 
regulatory target. 
 
This hypothesis requires a crucial complementary qualification. Indeed, it is plausible to 
expect that periods of political and/or economic crisis will dramatically alter the balance by raising 
the need of credibility of the government as a principal (which corresponds to the “numerator” in 
the equation). In other words: 
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Hypothesis 1.2: (Italians) anti-corruption agencies are strengthened (or weakened) over time 
following the demand-side of credibility (too). Specifically, the government delegates more 
independence when regulators are required to provide (additional) credibility in periods of 
political and/or economic turmoil. 
 
When we move from a snap-shot perspective focused on the delegation moment to a 
longitudinalunderstanding of politico-administrative relations based on within-case analysis, we can 
betterassess whether these two sets of explanatory factors are concomitantly at work. Indeed, an in-
depth look at the temporal ordering of events could indicate that these factors matter differently 
over time, that their combination is time-contingent, or that a specific factor played a crucial role in 
a given critical juncture. For instance,at some point policy makers may experience a variation in the 
severity of the credibility problem, and the evolution of the external environment may alter the 
pressures for establishing (more) independent agencies. In the analysis, we will give a special 
attention to the time dimension, but the specific role of time-related factors will emerge inductively 
from the case studies, in line with a within-case approach. Against this backdrop, we will assess the 
pertinence of the following two hypotheses for the process of agency reform with respect to the 
logic of delegation.  
What is more, longitudinal within-case analysis will also allow us to tackle the “how” 
question. A focus on sequences of reforms instead of the “delegation moment” implies to account 
even more for the fact that policy makers are building on existing structures. The argument of path 
dependence has been already applied to the investigation of agencification by previous public 
management studies which demonstrated that deeply rooted administrative traditions constrain 
agency design (Yesilkagit and Christensen 2010). However, there are conflicting expectations about 
the scale of (non-)change. On the one hand, one could expect that in extremely salient policy areas 
embedded in a political system with many veto players, such as for anti-corruption policies in Italy, 
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actors have high incentives to block regulatory reforms that might threaten their constituency, and 
consequently change will be only marginal, if any.  
 
Hypothesis 2.1: Italian anti-corruption agencies follow a path-dependent trajectory of 
development that locks-in previous decisions and produces a situation of stasis. The extreme 
salience of the issue combined with the high number of veto players reduce reform capacity 
at system-level. 
 
On the other hand, one could alternatively expect that in this situation it is still possible to observe 
incremental but ultimately transformative change (Streeck and Thelen 2005). The global 
development of the regulatory state has proven to lead to considerable macro-institutional 
transformations even in cases considered as resilient (Maggetti 2014). When the regulatory 
framework is characterized by low discretion in interpretation and enforcement, such as in 
anticorruption policy, the expected mode of change is layering, that is, a process that builds on 
existing rules and organizations through apparently marginal and non-fundamental phenomena of 
re-regulation, which will, however, eventually alter the logic of the regulatory model. 
 
Hypothesis 2.2: Italian anti-corruption agencies can be reformed according to a process of 
layering, whereby organizational evolution will eventually alter the logic of the regulatory 
framework. This process is determined by the presence of many veto players and low 
discretion in the implementation of the regulatory framework. 
 
Since structures provide opportunities and constraints to political actors but evolve only under the 
impulsion of human agents, we also expect that the presence of proactive political and/or agency 
leaders will be a key determinant of change.In that respect, one could hypothesize that political 
leaders are particularly pro-active when delegation concerns symbolic properties that do not 
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necessarily translate in practice, that is, when a social logic of delegation is at work(Mc Namara 
2002). This would allow them to reduce the risk of credibility losses as regulatory target.Instead, 
agencies leaders are expected to prefer to maximize their factual independence, which is their 
“raison d’être” and therefore is crucial for their organizational survival. 
 
Hypothesis 3:Political leaders are particularly pro-active when a social logic of delegation is 
at work, while agencies leaders would prefer to enjoy factual independence. 
 
Research Design and Methods 
As anticipated, this study is based on a diachronic within-case study design applied to a 
“representative case” with respect to the phenomenon under investigation. This analytical approach 
is well suited for tracing the complex interactions between governments and agencies within the 
broader historically rooted context as it adopts a form of explanation which attributes outcomes to 
the temporal intersection of multiple factors (George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2007).  
This approach will allow us to endogeneise a number of confounding factors, such as the 
institutional framework and the administrative culture, which are difficult to neutralize otherwise. 
What is more, a longitudinal perspective makes visible key variables that are usually 
underestimated, namely the role of political and/or agency’s leaders in pushing the reforms forward.  
 To operationalizeour hypotheses, we focus on the use of political control tools as dependent 
variable drawing on the operationalization of agency independence reported in previous studies of 
formal independence (Balla 2011; Gilardi and Maggetti 2011; Thatcher 2005) which includes the 
following items: 
1. Appointment of board members. This can be entrusted either to the Government or to the 
Parliament. Further, it can be constrained by rules on independence requirements (previous 
experiences, relationships with trade unions and political parties, notorious impartiality and 
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integrity), duration, dismissal and renewability of appointment, “cooling off” periods, 
revolving doors, incompatibility framework.  
2. Resources (Budget and staff). Budget can be determined by the executive or by the 
Parliament in the context of the annual budgeting. Staffing levels can be fixed by the law or 
decided autonomously by an agency. Autonomy depends on the stability (to program the 
activities) and their quantity (to make sustainable the attributed mission) of the available 
resources. 
3. Overturning of decisions. Political principals can overrule an agency decision or reject the 
agency advice.  
4. Manipulation of organizational basis, powers, and duties. This can be radical when 
politicians terminate agencies or change their organizational type. It can also concern the 
competencies of an agency with regard to rule-making, monitoring and sanctioning. 
Manipulation affects not only the structural dimension autonomy-control but also the 
functional one, that is the tasks entrusted to an agency (Elston 2014). In particular, in 
anticorruption policy we distinguish between enforcement (investigation and prosecution) 
and preventive functions (OECD 2013a).  
The following empirical analysis tracks changes in delegation to Italian anticorruption agencies 
since 2003 when the first agency was established. Participant observation in the period 2012-
2015has been combined with semi-structured interviews and documentary evidence to strengthen 
internal validity as well as gathering evidence on the pre-2012 period. As for semi-structured 
interviews, 5 respondents were selected for each of the 4 phases in which the trajectory of Italian 
anticorruption agencies has been segmented (see Empirical analysis). The 20 interviews were 
conducted face-to-face in Rome in the period December 2013-May 2015 with experts 
knowledgeable about Italian anticorruption policy. Experts hail from a variety of backgrounds, from 
political leaders and former board members of anticorruption agencies, to senior officials and policy 
advisors working in agencies and ministerial units dealing with corruption prevention. The 
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questionnaire included five themes (the use of political control tools and the role of three factors 
under investigation: government alternation, international pressures, agency activism) and it 
provided a working definition of each of its elements. The list of interviewees and the questionnaire 
are available from the authors.  
 
Empirical analysis 
The Path to the introduction of ACAs in Italy 
In comparative perspective Italy has experienced not only significant levels of corruption but also 
the maximum public exposure of corruption in the early 1990s when the scandal sparked by the 
“Clean Hands” judicial investigation led to the collapse of the governing political parties followed 
by a massive party system realignment which had no impact on the enduring fragmentation of 
coalition governments.  
Political change has not meant any true renewal in terms of firm political commitment to 
anticorruption efforts which entered into the political agenda after the national elections of April 
1996 won by the centre-left coalition led by Prodi (Della Porta and Vannucci 2007). In September 
1996, the House of deputies established a special commission to examine reform proposals 
produced by a committee for the study of causes and remedies for corruption (Camera deideputati – 
Comitato di studio sullaprevenzionedellacorruzione 1998). The analyses of the special commission 
were not translated into effective reforms but they triggereda parliamentary debate. The latter 
reproduced the divide between “watchdogs” and “guard dogs” types of anticorruption agencies that 
has appeared worldwide (Kuris 2015). 
The “guard dog” type was promoted by Antonio Di Pietro, a leading prosecutor of the Clean Hands 
investigations who later became a political leader in the centre-left coalition, with the aim of 
endowing an anticorruption agency with strong investigative powers. However, this approach - 
called the “gendarmerie” (gendarmone)for its focus on law enforcement - raised concerns about the 
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resources required to operate effectively and the possible tension with law enforcement partners, 
especially the judiciary. 
The “watchdog” type was advocated by a minority of experts and policy advisors who had designed 
public management reform in Italy since the early 1990s. According to this community, the 
gendarmerie approach consumes not only resources but also attention asit might distract policy 
makers from the need of systemic anticorruption efforts such aspublic management reforms. They 
rather envisaged the anticorruption agency as a small size “watchdog” that monitors issues of 
integrity and transparency and promotes wider administrative reforms to enhance sound 
management and accountability with respect to the ordinary civil service.  
However, this “administrative” approach faced contextual features severely hampering the 
implementation of public management reforms in Italy such as the vicious circle between distrust in 
public officials and legalism, the entrenched organizational fragmentation of the public sector at 
both the central and local level, the lack of mechanisms for policy coordination, and the absence of 
an administrative elite endowed with an esprit des corps (Ongaro and Valotti 2008).  
The debate on anticorruption agencies failed to produce concrete measures because of bickering 
within the fragmented centre-left coalition which led to the resignation of the Prodi government in 
1998 and to the succession of three different governments in the 1998-2001 period. As highlighted 
by the following sections, the administrative and gendarmerie approaches constituted the two poles 
around which the implementation anticorruption policy has oscillated since 2003 when the first 
anticorruption agency was established. 
 
Anticorruption High Commissioner (2003-2008): the inadequate launch of the “gendarmerie 
approach” 
In 2001 the centre-right coalition won the national elections and the second Berlusconi government 
was formed. Since 1994 the emergence as the leader of the centre-right coalition of Silvio 
Berlusconi,several times indicted for corruptioncrimes, has polarized the debate on anticorruption. 
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Judicial investigations have been denounced as a form of politically-biased intrusion of the 
magistracy in the political sphere. As a result, a number of measures, whichmany observers judged 
as tailored to the judicial needs of Silvio Berlusconi, were passed by the centre-right coalition after 
2001 to restrain and weaken the impact of the judicial investigations on corruption (DellaPorta and 
Vannucci 2007).  
Under a government characterized by the lack of commitment to credible anticorruption efforts, the 
Anticorruption High Commissioner (HC) was introduced by Law n. 15/2003 to meet a key 
requirement of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) which Italy signed in 
the same year.  
The HC was established as an executive agency focused on enforcement since its mandate included 
investigation of the causes of corruption, the assessment of the adequacy and consistency of the 
laws and organizational measures in place to curb corruption, and monitoring expenditure 
procedures.Yet, no law of ratification of the UNCAC was passed and the HC started operating only 
in 2005 under the pressure from the OECD. The latter monitored Italy in 2004 asking for an 
effective anticorruption agencyto implement its Anti-Bribery Convention which Italy had signed in 
1997 and ratified in 2000 (OECD 2004). 
Then, the centre-left coalition won the national elections held in April 2006. Given the 
fragmentation of its supporting coalition preventing any major reform of the anticorruption set-up 
from being enacted, the new Prodi government kept the HC degree of autonomy low on the five 
dimensions included in our research design (see Table 1). Both under the Berlusconi and Prodi 
government, the choice to institute an investigative authority was contradicted by the absence of 
any coercive power and by the inadequacy of the resources. Further, the design of the 
organizational basis and the appointment of agency leaders were solidly in the hands of the 
government. 
Under the new Prodi government, reforms stimulated by international pressures and by growing 
reputational concerns were mostly symbolic, in line with the argument of the social logic of 
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delegation. They were limited to the appointment as agency heads of prominent prefects of major 
cities, who were characterized by a well-known affiliation with the centre-left coalition which 
appointed them as flag-bearers of the fight for legality. The round of appointments started in 
January 2007 after the resignation of the first Commissioner Gianfranco Tatozzi, a low-profile 
judge close to the centre-right coalition which had been nominated by the Berlusconi government.  
Tatozzi resigned in December 2006 as a reaction to reform proposals threatening budget cuts and 
even the termination of the agency and he was followed by Bruno Ferrante, former prefect of Milan 
who had run for mayor in the same city in April 2006 after winning the centre-left primaries. 
Ferrante was appointed in January 2007 but it resigned in July when he was hired as top manager by 
a major company dealing with waste management in the organized crime-ridden southern regions. 
He was followed since September 2007 by Achille Serra, former prefect of Rome who later 
resigned from the HC position as he became Senator of the centre-left coalition in 2008.   
Therefore, the low level of institutional autonomy was complemented by the high instability of the 
commissioners who used the appointment as a springboard for further steps in their career. This 
implied a marginal and isolated role of the HC which could focus its activity only on episodic 
inspections. 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
CIVIT ante law 190/2012 (2008-late 2011): the shift to the “administrative approach” 
The formation of the fourth Berlusconi government after the large victory of the centre-right 
coalition in the national election of April 2008 entailed a lack of commitment to credible 
anticorruption efforts as rationale for delegation. As a reaction to the politicization of appointments 
by the previous Prodi government, the HC was included in the annex to Decree Law n. 112/2008 
which listed the “useless bodies” to be abolished for the sake of fiscal consolidation. HC 
competencies were transferred to the Anticorruption and Transparency Service - SAET, a simple 
office of the Public Administration Department, lacking any requirement of autonomy that 
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produced only a generic report containing data (mostly already known) about corruption in Italy 
(SAET 2009). 
International pressures continued to stimulate symbolic reforms under centre-right governments. In 
2009 the GRECO issued an evaluation report of anticorruption policy in Italy highlighting that it 
was restricted to the sphere of criminal investigation and punishment while neither a coordinated 
anticorruption program nor methodologies for assessing the efficiency of anticorruption measures 
targeting public administration had been put in place (GRECO 2009).  
Remarks from GRECO were addressed by the Public Administration Minister Brunetta which 
launched a public management reform (Legislative Decree n. 150/2009) establishing an 
independent regulatory agency, the Commission for the Evaluation, Integrity and Transparency of 
Public Bodies – CIVIT. This provision was meant to fill the gap of corruption prevention efforts – 
as later acknowledged by the GRECO (2011) – implying the re-launch of the administrative 
approach focused on modernization. Anticorruption was interconnected with performance 
management by mandating that public bodies should adopt triennial programmes for transparency 
and integrity under the methodological support offered by CIVIT.  
By identifying transparency as a key measure for the prevention of corruption, the new reform 
provided citizens with fullaccess on data regarding the activities and the performance of public 
bodies proactively disclosed by public administrations on their website to provide the public with 
an evidence base for action against corruption. Since 2011, as a result of the monitoring activity, 
CIVIT has published on its website periodical monitoring reports on the state of the art of 
transparency and performance management as well as addressing citizens’ requests about the 
compliance of administrations regarding transparency obligations. 
Given the lack of commitment exhibited by the Berlusconi government when establishing CIVIT, it 
was endowed with inadequate resources and deprived of sanctioning powers necessary to make its 
monitoring activity effective. The scarcity of resources was further exacerbated by the economic 
crisis which implied urgency in cutting the budget and the number of board members (Table 2). As 
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it already happened in the case of the HC, these cuts hampered the consolidation of the new agency. 
Given the scarcity of resources, two out of five original board members resigned and they were 
substituted only in December 2011 given the complex appointment procedure (see Table 2). Further 
instability was triggered by the reduction of the board members from five to three enacted by Law 
Decree n. 201/2011: the first President Antonio Martone, as a consequence of the modified 
composition of the board, let the presidency to Romilda Rizzo, while a third component of the 
Commission resigned.  
The only dimension where the CIVIT exhibited a high level of autonomy was the appointment of 
the board members which ensured independence as requested by the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption. It was this prerequisite to lay the ground for making CIVIT the national 
anticorruption agency under the Monti government.  
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
 
 
CIVIT-ANAC after law 190/2012 (late 2011-early2014): the failed institutionalization of the 
“administrative approach” 
The Berlusconi government proved unable to counteract the effects of the ever-increasing fiscal 
crisis and to reverse the path of faltering legitimacy of the political class fueled by a number of 
corruption investigations. This paved the way for a new “technical” government led by the former 
EU Competition Commissioner Mario Monti and supported by a large bipartisan coalition in late 
2011.  
In the effort to support the restoration of markets’ trust in Italian government – a key determinant of 
sustainable growth – the new government put the anticorruption policy at the centre of its agenda as 
revealed by the ratification of the Council’s of Europe Civil and Criminal Law Conventions on 
Corruption (Law 110/2012; Law 112/2012) thirteen years after their signature. Further, the SAET 
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was shut down and the CIVIT was defined as National Anticorruption Authority to meet the request 
from the United Nations Convention Against Corruption to establish an independent anticorruption 
agency.  
In this period, further rationales complemented the social logic of delegation in the effort for 
granting more autonomy to the CIVIT. First, the Monti government displayed a high level of 
commitment to credible anticorruption policy in the attempt to counteract the rise of the anti-
establishment “Five Star Movement” which campaigned for more transparency and public integrity. 
Given its technical nature, the new government was composed of ministers who had not been 
previously involved in politics. This meant that they could promote anticorruption without worrying 
to be targeted by anticorruption efforts. Credible commitment was further boosted by a wave of 
major scandals which revealed diffused corruption and maladministration at regional level 
(especially in Latium and Lombardy) in Spring 2012.These scandals triggered a mass media 
campaign to promote the revision of a manifestly inadequate anticorruption policy set up. This 
campaign provided the pressure needed to overcome political stalemate and a major anticorruption 
package (law n. 190/2012) was eventually approved after almost two years of debate in Parliament.  
Second, the very brief time span between the approval of the Anticorruption package in late 2012 
and the national elections which were approaching in early 2013 posed severe time inconsistency 
problems. Political uncertainty forced the Monti government to approve before the end of the 
mandate four key provisions: a new Code of Conduct for public personnel and three legislative 
decrees concerning, respectively, the prohibition to be elected or however to be appointed to 
political position in case of criminal conviction (245/2012), a review of transparency obligations 
(33/2013) and the incompatibility framework regarding administrative positions (39/2013).  The 
implementation of these provisions was delegated to the CIVIT so as to bind the hands of future 
incumbents preventing them from undoing the anticorruption policy. This provision implied a 
reinforcement of the “administrative approach” since the CIVIT was entrusted with additional tasks 
regarding regulation and monitoring of the implementation of three-year rolling anticorruption 
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plansadopted by public organizations drawing on risk assessment and within the framework set by 
the National Anticorruption Plan. The latter was formulated by the Ministry for Public 
Administration and approved by the CIVIT. 
A key factor for the reinforcement of the administrative approach was the appointment ofFilippo 
PatroniGriffi as Minister of Public Administration. As a key member of the expert community 
advocating public management reform in Italy who previously served as the head of cabinet for the 
Minister Brunetta (2009-late 2010) and then as a CIVIT board member (late 2010-late 2011), 
PatroniGriffisupportedthe attribution of additional powers, by extending of the existing 
strategyfocused on the integration between performance management, transparency and integrity. 
However, additional powers were entrusted to the CIVIT without making it able to rely on a 
predictable budget. In a context of widespread popular dissatisfaction towards the public sector as a 
whole, a further budget cut was enacted in 2012 since the government adopted across-the-board 
cutback management for all public organizations, regardless of the saliency of their mission. No 
sanctioning powers were granted to the CIVIT accordingly to the administrative approach. The 
agency could only carry out inspections and require public organizations’ conduct in keeping with 
integrity and transparency rules.  
The subsequent political developments made the agency’s institutionalization process even more 
complicated. The 2013 national elections were marked by the success of the anti-establishment 
“Five Star Movement” which led to a hung Parliament. Eventually, an unusual grand coalition 
government led by Letta, a MP of the centre-left Democratic Party, was formed two months after 
the elections. In November 2013 Berlusconi exited from the grand coalition as a reaction to his first 
definitive criminal conviction implying his expulsion from Parliament on the basis of legislative 
decree n. 245/2012. However, Letta was able to survive becausea new faction (New Centre Right 
Party) split from the party led by Berlusconi and supported the incumbent government in exchange 
of key ministerial portfolios, including that of Public Administration Minister which was assigned 
to the career-politician GianpieroD’Alia. 
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The shift from a technical to a political government altered dramatically the political context in 
which the agency operated since the influential New Centre Right Party inherited the lack of 
commitment towards anticorruption exhibited by the previous centre-right governments. Symbolic 
reasons explain the compliancewith the agreements signed by previous governments in line with 
recommendation from the OECD (2013b)whose integrity review of Italy was released in 2013 Fall.  
However, the leadership of the CIVIT embraced a zealous approach to the implementation of the 
Anticorruption law. The agency’s activism implied the risk of high “agency losses” for the 
government with regard to the implementation of the legislative decree n. 39/2013 regulating the 
incompatibility between political and managerial functions in local administrations. In a context 
such as the Italian one,where most of local politicians heldsimultaneouslyand/or in sequence 
different political and administrative positions, the national association of local authorities (ANCI) 
made a public statement asking for the postponement of the decree application. This request was not 
addressed by the CIVIT which disposed the immediate and total application of the legislative decree 
39/2013 which made a large part of local politicians incompatible with administrative positions 
(Deliberation 46/2013).  
This provision increased the tension between the agency and the government since the latter was 
sustained by many local politicians, sharing the ANCI’s concerns regarding the immediate 
application of the incompatibility framework. As a reaction, the Letta government adopted two 
emergency measures curtailing the agency’s autonomy in addition to a new round of budget cuts. 
First, an unprecedented overturning of the agency’s decision occurred in August 2013 when the 
Parliament adopted a law that postponed the application of the incompatibility framework as well as 
moving the interpretative power from the CIVIT to the Ministry of Public Administration (Law 
Decree n. 69/2013). Second, Law Decree 101/2013 changed the name of the agency from CIVIT to 
ANAC (Anticorruption National Authority) as the agency’s mission was focused only on 
anticorruption by transferring powers on performance management to an agency entrusted with the 
management of collective bargaining.  
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The exclusive focus on anticorruption was the official motivation behind the change of the board 
composition from 3 to 5 members.This provided room for the new appointment of all the 
components as the career background of former members was deemed to be focused on 
performance management (Table 3). However, in both the parliamentary and public debate 
(SenatodellaRepubblica 2013; Melis 2013), the new round of appointments has been interpreted as 
a political retaliation against the zealous CIVIT board members introducing an unprecedented case 
of spoils system (first threatened and then practiced respectively before and after CIVIT 
Deliberation 46/2013). The politicization of the agency was also increased by the new procedure for 
the appointment of the President which no longer required the approval by a qualified majority in 
Parliamentary commissions.  
The reaction against the agency’s activism was also made possible by the lack of public support 
enjoyed by the CIVIT board members who give low priority to the investigative tasks in line with 
the “administrative approach” to anticorruption policy. The latter was perceived by the public as 
toothless in a context marked by outright rampant corruption. This perception was shared by 
international observers such as the European Commission (2014) which reported that the under-
resourced CIVIT had so far seen its role in a limited way, mostly focused on the formal verification 
of documents prepared by public administrations.  
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
The merger ANAC-AVCP (early 2014-2016): the return of the “gendarmerie” approach 
In February 2014, an Anticorruption report on Italy was released by the European Commission 
(2014) demanding for more effective anticorruption policy, including the transfer of more powers 
and resources to the ANAC. In the same month, the renewal in the leadership of the Democratic 
Party implied the sudden end of the Letta government. The new leader Matteo Renzi took over as 
the youngest Prime Minister in the Italian history meeting the demand for a much-awaited 
generational change. Renzi put anticorruption policy at the centre of the government agenda in the 
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attempt to counteract the attacks of the Five Star Movement on Italian mainstream parties which 
lurched from one corruption scandal to another.  
The first initiative adopted by the new government was the appointment of Raffaele Cantone as 
President of the ANAC in late March 2014. A former anti-mafia prosecutor in Naples, Cantone 
enjoyed fast-growing popularity among public opinion to the such an extent to be selected as “2014 
Man of the Year” by a prominent weekly news magazine (L’Espresso 2014). The appointment was 
meant to focus the agency on the “gendarmerie” approach which was deemed more effective than 
the “administrative” one in addressing the need to reassure both the European Commission and the 
public. 
Efforts to provide credibility in regulating corruption received further impetus in late Spring 2014 
when a new wave of major corruption scandals hit the Expo 2015 in Milan and the flood barrier 
system in Venice. Scandals prompted the adoption of the emergency Decree Law 90/2014 shifting 
the responsibility of formulating the National Anticorruption Plan from the Ministry for Public 
Administration to the ANAC. The latter was also charged with the responsibility of receiving 
complaints on possible misconduct fromwhistle-blowers, and imposing monetary sanctions to those 
public administrations that failed to adopt anticorruption plans, transparency programmes and codes 
of conduct. 
Decree Law 90/2014 also provided the termination of the Authority for the Supervision of Public 
Contracts (AVCP) and its organizational merger with the ANAC. The merger of the two agencies 
was meant to strengthen the gendarmerie approach by bringing the supervision of public 
procurement under the agency led by Cantone.  The latter was also given special personal powers to 
oversee procurement procedures related to the implementation of the Expo 2015 in Milan, due to 
open May next year. In exercising this role of supervision, in October 2014 ANAC and the OECD 
signed a memorandum of understanding referring to the monitoring of Expo 2015 tender 
procedures. The controls carried out by the ANAC under the methodological supervision by the 
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OECD made it possible to respect the deadline of May 2015, leaving a legacy of high principles for 
integrity and transparency of major events and related infrastructure (ANAC and OECD 2015).  
The success in weeding out graft in the contracts of Expo 2015 boosted the popularity of Cantone 
who called for further powers. This request was reinforced by the outbreak of a new major 
corruption scandal in the municipality of Rome in November 2014, leading to the delegation of 
more monitoring powers in the field of public procurement to the ANAC in Spring 2015 when the 
Anticorruption Law n. 190/2012 was amended by Law n. 69/2015. Since August 2015 the approach 
for monitoring procurement procedures pioneered at the 2015 Expo in Milan was applied to the 
Jubilee of mercy due to open in Rome at the end of the year.  
Yet, the endless eruption of scandals related to the management of procurement procedures in 
Rome, whose shortcomings had been highlighted by an investigation conducted by the ANAC 
(Deliberation 207/2016), kept concerns about corruption high, triggering a new spate of 
anticorruption provisions. In early Spring 2016 the transposition of European directives in the field 
of public contracts (Legislative Decree 50/2016) provided an opportunity to strengthen not only the 
supervisory functions (precautionary interventions on tendering processes and sanctions for failure 
to comply with ANAC’s recommendations) but also the regulatory ones: contracting authorities 
must be recorded in a registry subject to ANAC assessment; ANAC adopts instruments of flexible 
regulation also with binding effectiveness; ANAC’s recommendations in pre-litigation mechanisms 
are now binding. In late Spring 2016, the review of the provisions on anticorruption and 
transparency (Legislative Decree 97/2016) charged ANAC with further regulatory responsibilities 
with regard to the implementation of the newly introduced freedom of information act. Concerning 
obligations for proactive disclosure by public administrations, ANAC was entrusted with more 
regulatory and sanctioning powers. 
In sum, the consolidation of the gendarmerie approach advocated by Cantone gained prominence in 
the wake of scandals intensifying the need of credibility of the Renzi government. However, there 
were drawbacks to the wide range of powers granted to the ANAC. It faced higher expectations and 
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it required more resources against a backdrop of legalist intricacies slackening the organizational 
mergerwith the AVCP (ANAC 2016). The merger occurred under the persistent pressure for 
expenditure reduction focused on personnel in a context where dismissal and transfer of public 
servants face strong resistance from powerful veto players such as unions. As a result, the approval 
of the agency’s reorganization plan occurred only in February 2016 ensuring the survival of the 
former AVCP personnel disguised as ANAC. The latter has been banned to recruit new staff with 
skills that match the functions related to anticorruption and transparency until early 2017. 
 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This article has examined changes in Italian anticorruption agencies’ mandate and powers over 
time.Our study confirms that anticorruption policy is particularly interesting for studying delegation 
processes over time since it is exposed to contradictory pressures between independence and control 
that make delegation “a rollercoaster shaped by changes in government” (Batory 2012). More 
specifically, our empirical analysis has focused on the interplay between explanatory factors over 
time drawing three mainfindings.   
First, the empirical analysis has highlightedthe negative disposition towards independence 
exhibited by those government (Berlusconi and Letta) supported by political elites who had strong 
incentives to avoid the risk that agency will focus on their previous conduct in office.Conversely, 
the risk of agency losses was much lower for those government (Monti and Renzi) composed of 
political elites who did not worry to be targeted by independent regulators. In particular, agency 
independence has been enhanced most under the Monti government as the only case in which 
political uncertainty (Moe 1989) acted as a pressure for delegation. In this case, it was the technical 
nature of the Monti government and its short-term perspective that posed severe time inconsistency 
problems which were addressed by delegating powers to the agency as a way to stick anticorruption 
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policy before the return of conventional governments of political leaders. By influencing the career 
background of political principals and their time horizons, the alternation in government has 
therefore provided more or less incentives for political control. In that regard it is worth noting that 
the demand for credible commitment to anticorruption policy has constituted a crucial factor 
encouraging agency independence particularly under the pressure put on political leaders by 
scandals. This finding confirms the common reference to scandals in the literature on anticorruption 
agencies (Batory 2012), where they are seen as triggers reinforcing credible commitments. 
However, scandals influence agency independence only if political conditions are also present. By 
exposing the inadequacy of the system, scandals reinforced the need for credible commitments of 
those governments whose leaders (Monti and Renzi) came to power by emphasizing the need for a 
radical break with the past.What is more, our findings clarify the role of recommendations from 
international organizations which refer to agencies as the legitimate institutional model for 
anticorruption policy. Those external pressures for adoption have been constant throughout the 
period under investigation providing impetus for agency creation and survival. Therefore, the 
cyclical fluctuation displayed by the historical trajectory of agencies imply that delegation has been 
affected primarily by domestic factors.All in all, these findings confirm our hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2: 
the extent of delegation corresponds to the balance stroke by governments between expected 
credibility gains as a principal and expected credibility losses as a target, in a context punctuated by 
domestic crises and scandals that acted as triggers for reforms. 
 Second, the analysis does not support hypothesis 2.1 while mostly corroborating hypotheses 
2.2 as regards the mode of institutional reform, even though some qualifications are in order. 
Indeed, a process of layering seems at work, which is however characterized by an unusually high 
frequency of reform activity. This suggests that even in highly salient fields populated by many veto 
players and with low discretion in implementation, institutional change is possible. More 
specifically, our operationalization of agency independence has also allowed us to track how the use 
of political control tools has changed over time. We found that political principals have relied 
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mostly on appointments, resources and manipulation of powers. As for the latter, it has affected not 
only the structural dimension but also the functional one by swinging competences between the 
poles of prevention and enforcement thus revealing the potential of our integrated framework for 
investigating agency autonomy. One tool, that is the overturning of agency’s decision, has been 
used only once when the Letta government reacted to the agency’s zealous implementation of the 
incompatibility framework highlighting the role of agency’s activism as a factor influencing 
delegation. Thus, our study also support hypothesis 3, about the role of proactive political and/or 
agency leaders in institutional reforms, which has been underestimated so far by historical 
institutionalists. This is a factor that should be reconsidered and given more attention, especially 
through qualitative studies that can uncover the “black box” of the politics of delegation process 
characterized by circles of reactions and counter-reactions.  
 Turning to the broader implications of our study, these findings suggest to qualify the main 
functional arguments for delegation to independent regulators, that is, the assumption that 
government delegate regulatory competencies in order to solve time-inconsistency problems and 
thereby increase the credibility of regulatory policies. On the one hand, it appears that governments 
that suffer from stronger credibility problems are not those delegating the most. Instead, the 
contrary is true. Governments that do not anticipate any threat by regulators tend to confer them 
with more power. This means that the demand-side of credibility is crucial.On the other hand, we 
can observe that regulatory reforms are more frequent that expected, and that delegation can be 
quite easily reverted, even in a unfavorable context characterized by many veto players and limited 
discretion in implementation. This state of affairs suggests to rethink the “principal-agent” 
frameworkby including reputational concerns more systematically and more explicitly. However, 
our findings are preliminary and limited cases similar to the one under investigation, that is, highly 
salient policy areas where the government is a “principal” and a regulatory target at the same time. 
By comparing multiple cases across countries and policy sectors, further case studies could reduce 
the limitations inherent to single-case design (Rohlfing 2012). 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Anticorruption High Commissioner: Autonomy indicators by dimensions 
1. Nominate the head and the members of ACAs.  
Nomination procedure: Council of Ministers on proposal of the Prime Minister 
Appointment Requirements: Selected among judges, State solicitors, military generals, top public managers 
Appointment duration: 5 years 
Cooling off period: null 
2. Determine ACAs’ budget and staffing levels. 
Budget: 2003 and 2004 euros 582.000 each year; 2005 euros 6.000.000; 2006 euros 6.460.000; 2007 euros 3.800.000; 2008 euros 2.582.000 
Notional Staff dimension: From 66 to 83 units in the period 2005-2007 
Actual Staff dimension: from 40 to 57 units in the period 2005-2008 
Staff stability: staff borrowed by other public administrations and temporary workers 
Budget and organizational rules: budget, staff dimension, and internal organization defined by a spate of Prime Minister decrees 
3. Overturning of decisions 
NULL 
4. To alter the organisational basis, powers, and duties of ACAs by legislation. 
Approach: Gendarmerie – Focus on Enforcement 
Statutory reserve about mission and powers: not specified by the law but by a Prime Minister decree; Agency termination threatened under the Prodi II 
government by the Public Administration Minister Mr Nicolais 
Powers: to collect information from public administrations; to warn public administrations about observed inadequacies or inconsistency; to report 
periodically to the Parliament 
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Table 2. CIVIT before n. 190/2012 law: autonomy indicators by dimensions 
1. Nominate the head and the members of ACAs.  
Members nomination procedure: qualified majority of 2/3 of the components of the competent Commissions of Chambers of Deputy and Senate on 
proposal by the Council of Ministers 
Appointment Requirements: high professional experts in the fields of public management; no eligibility of those who had political positions or 
appointments in political parties or trade unions in the previous three years. 
Appointment duration: 6 years 
Number of members: originally 5 then cut to 3 by Law Decree 211/2011 
President: elected by the components 
Cooling off period: null 
2. Determine ACAs’ budget and staffing levels. 
Budget: euros 8 million each year (Law 15/2009) 
Budget annual cuts: 10% in 2011 
Notional Staff dimension: 30 units of personnel complemented by 10 experts 
Actual Staff dimension: From 18 to 21 units in the period 2011-2012 
Staff stability: staff borrowed by other public administrations and temporary workers 
Budget and organizational rules: defined by a Prime Minister Decree in spring 2010 
3. Overturning of decisions 
NULL 
4. To alter the organisational basis, powers, and duties of ACAs by legislation.  
Approach: Administrative Innovation – Focus on Prevention 
Statutory reserve about mission and powers: the prolonged discussion of an anticorruption bill before Parliament (from May 2010 to December 2012) has 
kept the agency under high uncertainty about its survival and its competences  
Powers: Violations of the transparency obligations were sanctioned only at the reputational level by the reports of the CIVIT 
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Table 3. CIVIT-ANAC post Law n. 190/2012: autonomy indicators by dimensions 
1. Nominate the head and the members of ACAs.  
Members nomination procedure: qualified majority of 2/3 of the components of the competent Commissions of the Chambers of Deputy and the Senate on 
proposal by the Council of Ministers.  
Appointment Requirements: to be high professional experts not only in the field of public management but also in that of anticorruption policies; no 
eligibility of those who had been elected in political positions or had appointments in political parties or trade unions in the previous three years  
Appointment duration: 6 years, but renewal of all its components (Law Decree 101/2013) 
Number of Members: 4 until October 2013, then 5 
President: appointed by the Government (Law 221/2012) 
Cooling off period: null 
2. Determine ACAs’ budget and staffing levels. 
Budget: about 5 million in 2013 
Budget annual cuts: 40% in 2012; about 15% in 2013  
Notional Staff dimension: 30 units of personnel complemented by 10 experts 
Actual Staff dimension: 24 persons at the end of 2013 
Staff stability: staff borrowed by other public administrations and temporary workers 
Budget and organizational rules: defined by a Prime Minister Decree in spring 2010 
3. Overturning of decisions 
The application of the incompatibility framework was postponed by emergency Law Decree 69/2013 
4. To alter the organisational basis, powers, and duties of ACAs by legislation. 
Approach: Administrative Innovation – Focus on Prevention 
Statutory reserve about mission and powers: Transfer of competences defined by the Letta government via emergency Law Decree 101/2013: the power to 
clarify the ambiguities of anticorruption provisions has been transferred from the ANAC to the Ministry of Public Administration; performance management 
competences have been temporally transferred from the ANAC to the ARAN (Agency for collective bargaining) 
Powers: to order public administrations to remove punctual violations or inertias without sanctions (Law 190/2012) 
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Table 4. ANAC post Law Decree 90/2014: Autonomy indicators by dimensions 
1. Nominate the head and the members of ACAs.  
Members nomination procedure: qualified majority of 2/3 of the components of the competent Commissions of the Chambers of Deputy and the Senate on 
proposal by the Council of Ministers.  
Appointment Requirements: high professional experts in the fields of public management and anticorruption policy; no eligibility of those who had political 
positions or appointments in political parties or trade unions in the previous three years. 
Appointment duration: 6 years 
Member number: 5 
President: appointed by the Government (Law 221/2012). 
Cooling off period: 2 years 
2. Determine ACAs’ budget and staffing levels. 
Budget: about 47 million in 2015, a cut of 25% considering the previous ANAC and AVCP budgets 
Notional Staff dimension: 350 units, a cut of 16 people considering the sum of the ANAC and AVCP previous notional staffs and of 30% of the personnel 
costs considering the sum of the ANAC and AVCP previous expenditure 
Actual Staff dimension: From 318 to 295 units in the period May 2015-December 2016 
Staff stability: tenured staff, mostly inherited from the AVCP without any specific skill in anticorruption 
Budget and organizational rules: Defined by a Prime Minister Decree in early February 2016 
3. Overturning of decisions 
NULL 
4. To alter the organisational basis, powers, and duties of ACAs by legislation.  
Approach: Gendarmerie – Focus on Enforcement 
Statutory reserve about mission and powers: Transfer of competences defined by the Renzi government via emergency Law Decree 90/2014: performance 
management competences transferred to the Ministry of Public Administration on a permanent basis while ANAC received the former Ministry’s tasks on 
transparency and anticorruption complemented by powers previously attributed to the AVCP with regard to public procurement; further, the President of 
the Agency was entrusted with tasks related to the oversight of EXPO 2015 public contracts 
Powers: sanctions for those administrations which have not adopted Transparency Programmes, Anticorruption Plans, and Codes of Conduct (Law Decree 
90/2014); monitoring powers in the field of public procurement (Law 69/2015); regulatory powers in the field of public procurement (Legislative Decree 
50/2016); regulatory powers with regard to freedom of information and sanctioning powers concerning obligations for proactive disclosure (Legislative 
Decree 97/2016) 
 
 
